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Since its foundation the European Union has experienced an increase in the 
dispersion of its welfare systems. The goal of a Social Union, completing the 
economic and monetary union, is increasingly out of reach. The absence of a 
jointly regulated labor market is a destabilizing factor that triggers social compe-
tition and wage deflation. To avoid the risks associated with such a situation it 
is necessary to agree on policies aimed at returning to full employment and to 
choose between “neo-liberal” or “social” work sharing. The absence of short-
term prospects for a complete social harmonization requires the acceptance of 
jointly managed of social boundaries that allow both the mobility and the effec-
tive protection of workers.
Employment policies and social protection have been 
excluded from the domain of Community policies in the name of 
subsidiarity. Member States are the sole responsible for the defini-
tion and implementation of social policies. In theory, only the 
Open Method of Coordination (OMC) is used to influence 
national policy and if possible make them more or less consistent 
and convergent.
But in practice the freedom of States on social protection is 
restricted by constraints stemming from other Community 
policies. Thus:
— The coordination of fiscal and economic policies imposes 
strong constraints on the financing of social protection, 
particularly during times of crisis. Governments face limits 
in the use they can make of social protection to stabilize 
economic activity. They are therefore encouraged (when 
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they are not ordered to do so by the Commission) to engage 
in social dumping.
— The free movement of persons, freedom of establishment, 
and competition laws, set constraints on subjecting workers 
to national law. Temporary work and the posting of workers 
from one country to another permit, to some extent, to 
circumvent labor law and choose where to pay social 
contributions.
— Competition policy and treaty interpretation by the Euro-
pean Court of Justice, set the limit of public intervention in 
matters of social insurance; for a health insurance or a 
pension plan to be sheltered from competition, they must 
meet a number of strict conditions: social object, compul-
sory membership, etc.
— Citizens' rights and the principle of non-discrimination 
impose obligations derived from treaties and not just from 
national laws (in terms of retirement age, for example, or 
family benefits that cannot be modulated by gender). In this 
area, as in the previous case, established law cases play a 
central role.
The issue of rationalization of Community constraints on labor 
law and social protection, beyond good practices recommenda-
tions, arises in a context of generalized crisis and strong 
heterogeneity of economic and labor markets performances. After 
a short analysis of the situation (§ 1), we present the two main 
options to overcome the crisis and return to full employment 
(§ 2). Finally we will examine possible broad lines of a long-term 
program of social convergence in Europe (§ 3).
1. Unemployment crisis, and European divides 
Europe as a whole is in crisis, and its labor market is very unbal-
anced: the unemployment rate of the EU27 is 10.8% (January 
2014) and in the euro area it raises to 12%. Overall, Europe is far 
from full employment. The causes of this crisis are well known: 
triggered by the recession of 2008/2009 due to the financial crisis, 
rising unemployment has not been halted by the economic poli-
cies whose primary purpose was, since 2011, to reduce public 
debt. Macroeconomic analyses of rising unemployment in Europe 
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point mainly to the crisis and the lack of effective response of 
economic policy; as a consequence, the priority for Europe should 
be to revise its macroeconomic doctrine (Blot, Creel and Timbeau, 
2014 OFCE, IMK, ECLM, 2014). Issues specific to labor market 
functioning are of second order at best ; while it is certain that 
improving market smoothness, and bridging the gap between 
labor supply and demand would certainly contribute to improving 
the situation, specific employment and labor market policies will 
not by themselves bring back to full employment, most notably in 
the countries affected by mass unemployment.
Unemployment in Europe is both massive and widely 
dispersed. In December 2013, the unemployment rate was 27.5% 
in Greece and 5% in Austria.  The difference between maximum 
and minimum is of nearly 23 points. By comparison, the United 
States unemployment rate in November 2013 was 7% with a 
maximum of 9% in Rhode Island and a minimum of 2.6% in North 
Dakota, a difference of 6.4 points. The variation coefficient1 in 
unemployment in Europe and the United States were very different 
with a level of 51% in Europe (57% in the Eurozone) and 24% in 
the United States.
If we look at income dispersion between countries, it worsened 
over time, with the enlargement to eastern economies increasing 
remarkably de diversity of the European institutional space 
(Table 1). 
The history of the European Union is characterized by a first 
phase of convergence ranging from 1958 to 1995 followed by a 
period of divergence initiated by the enlargement of the Union to 
the East (Table 1). Today, the income convergence in Europe is 
stalling and this is reason of concern for the future, because the 
very large differences created by enlargement continue to weigh on 
the building of solidarity among states with very heterogeneous 
levels of wealth and income.
Very large income and wage inequalities among countries are a 
defining European feature. They explain the difficulty of imple-
menting common policies as they encourage the development of 
1. The variation coefficient measures the dispersion of a variable as the ratio between the 
standard error and the average
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social competition, the less wealthy having the tendency to use 
their wage advantage to gain competitiveness with respect to 
partner countries.
Last, Europe is very heterogeneous in what concerns demog-
raphy. On the one hand, Ireland, France, Britain, the Scandinavian 
countries, Belgium and the Netherlands have maintained fertility 
rates between 1.7 and 2 which allow a long-term stabilization of 
population. On the other, Germany, southern, and eastern Euro-
pean countries have very low fertility rates, below 1.5, that will 
lead to decreasing total population and workforce. These countries 
face very negative evolution of potential growth and of the ratio 
between active and inactive population. Migration between coun-
tries would likely homogenize the demographic outlook. But 
Europe remains a linguistic mosaic and this structurally limits 
mobility between EU states. This heterogeneity of demographic 
perspectives has a significant impact on long-term macroeconomic 
constraints facing each zone. Countries with low fertility rates 
must prepare for the future by saving to finance an increasing 
pension burden. Their debt is less sustainable in the long term and 
they must implement rigorous public spending policies. Countries 
with higher fertility rates must also prepare for the future, but their 
constraints are different: their main problem is to finance educa-
tion for the future labor force, while they are less constrained by 
Table 1. Coefficients of variation of GDP per capita in Europe: from the founding 
members to the Europe of 27
In %
1958 1973 1986 1995 2004 2007 2011
UE 6 16 10 6,5 7 9 11 14
UE 9 13 13 8 14 16 14
UE 12 21 19 20 22 22
UE 15 17 18 19 20
UE 25 35 32 31
UE 27 36 35
EU6 : Germany + Belgium + France + Italy (+ Luxembourg) + Netherlands
EU9 = EU6 + Denmark + Ireland + UK
EU12 = EU9 + Greece + Spain + Portugal
EU15 = EU12 + Austria + Finland + Sweden
EU25 = EU15 + Cyprus + Estonia + Hungary + Latvia + Lithuania + Malta + Poland + Czech Republic + Slovakia + 
Slovenia
EU27 = EU25 + Bulgaria + Romania.
Source: Penn World Tables; Note: calculations do not take into account the Luxembourg.
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long-term debt. Demographic differences also have short-and 
long-term labor market effects. Countries with low fertility rates 
have less potential for growth, while at the same time not needing 
it as much as high fertility countries ; the latter in addition also 
suffer more from negative macroeconomic shocks.
Europe’s heterogeneity is a challenge for the harmonization of 
social policies. So far the Commission and all the political authori-
ties in Europe have always argued that recommendations could be 
of general applicability. The very principle of the Open Method of 
Coordination (OMC), which is the main tool for social legislation, 
is built around the definition of “best practices” aimed at achieving 
universally applicable policies. It might be useful to revisit this 
assumption and examine all the consequences of strong heteroge-
neities of income, labor market and demographic, with the 
objective of designing policies that best fit the situation of each 
country. Labor market policies are a simple example showing that 
it is not possible to conduct the same policy in all countries: work 
incentives obviously do not play the same role in countries which 
are at full employment and in those that experience mass unem-
ployment. Strict management of unemployment insurance may be 
justified in the former, while in the latter it may lead to impover-
ishing the unemployed.
2. The Main Options for Employment and Labor Market 
Policies
The wide dispersion of unemployment, and diverging demo-
graphic trends, have led some, especially in Germany, to suggest 
that migration between states could be a solution. Of course, 
mobility is useful for ensuring a better match between supply and 
demand for labor, in particular if growth gaps are significant. It 
should be encouraged, especially because exchanges between Euro-
pean citizens are useful in strengthening the solidarity across 
countries. However, free movement should not be turned into an 
obligation of mobility, which would risk causing the opposite 
effect of feeding nationalistic and anti-European sentiment. Labor 
mobility should furthermore be complemented by the effort of 
moving capital and production to regions where labor availability 
is larger. It would be important to put in place a coherent territo-
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rial policy at the European level, going well beyond the mere 
financing of infrastructures. A precondition for this would be the 
definition of a European industrial policy, that in turn would 
require challenging the dogma of governments abstaining from 
intervention in the definition of industrial choices.2 The debate on 
this issue is nonexistent.
Beyond macroeconomic policies, only labor market specific 
policies may ultimately be used to try to reduce unemploy-
ment. Especially when, for countries facing very high 
unemployment, it becomes evident that the absence of growth 
policies in Europe requires searching for national solutions. 
Employment policy deals with work sharing and with labor 
income. Blaming malfunctioning labor markets for the current 
level of unemployment in Europe is not very serious. Spain 
provides a good example of unemployment rooted in the problems 
of other markets, notably finance and housing. The Spanish unem-
ployment rate was 7.9% in May 2007, it rose to 17.9% in May 2009 
and it has reached over 26% in January 2014. This trend is rather a 
sign of extreme flexibility than of rigid labor markets.3 Explana-
tions based on structural gaps between demand and supply of 
skills, or the sudden appearance of the unemployed’s reluctance to 
react to incentives, obviously makes very little sense. Under these 
conditions, improving the functioning of labor markets, while 
making little harm, can only have a very marginal impact on 
unemployment.
Specific policies that may have an important impact all involve 
a very significant drop in wages and labor costs. In an open 
economy, this may be sought in order to gain competitiveness vis-
à-vis foreign competitors on external and domestic markets. It is 
obvious that this option, wage deflation to gain market shares is 
absolutely inappropriate to the situation in Europe: besides its 
non-cooperative features, at odds with the supposed solidarity of 
European countries, wage deflation cannot succeed if it is applied 
simultaneously in all countries (OFCE, IMK, ECLM, 2014). The 
2. There are exceptions to the dogma. Localization of Airbus plants, for example, has been the 
subject of intense political bargaining. But the European Commission never intervened to put 
forward the European’s general interest.
3. For an analysis of the reaction of labor markets to the crisis, see: Cochard Marion, Gérard 
Cornilleau et Eric Heyer (2010).
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only possible gain of competitiveness, with respect to the rest of 
the world, would be largely insufficient to compensate for the 
resulting decrease of domestic demand. It may even be offset by an 
overall appreciation of the euro if the lack of demand in the EU 
leads to a current account surplus vis-à-vis the rest of the world.
There are two solutions to enable labor and income sharing. The 
“neo-liberal” solution is to decrease the cost of labor, whether or 
not initiated by labor market flexibility. The “social” solution is the 
collective reduction of working time, some harmonization of social 
conditions, and wage coordination that avoid any temptation to 
rely on social dumping for the return to full employment.
The choice between the two solutions needs to be a political 
one. There is no “economic” supremacy of one or the other. Both 
options should be subject to debate, but the choice is often 
obscured by the discourse falsely assuming that “there is no other 
solution” than the neo-liberal one. 
Work sharing can rely on lower overhead salaries (contribu-
tions borne by the business) that can be decided by the 
government in centralized countries or by bargaining in the most 
decentralized countries. This solution allows to manage the distri-
butional effects of reduced benefits or social expenditure that must 
accompany the reduction in social contributions. This method is 
in between the neo-liberal and social method. But it can only be 
applied up to a certain extent, as is the case in France, because it 
quickly leads to possible reductions in benefits or to increases in 
other taxes acceptable.
Making labor markets more flexible is the preferred, and 
certainly the most effective way to lower wages in the long 
term. This is the method that has been used in Germany and is also 
applied, in a less systematic manner in France (less effectively, 
thanks to the existence of a minimum wage).The primary means for 
increasing flexibility is the reduction of protection for the unem-
ployed to reduce their wage claims and demands of job 
stability. Increased flexibility thus requires slashing the generosity 
of unemployment insurance and the drastic reduction of legal 
restrictions on the employment contract. On this basis many unem-
ployed are then forced to accept short-term employment, with 
unstable and low wages. Employment may increase due to the 
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reduction of relative labor and capital costs, but also because 
consumers are encouraged to shift towards sectors of the economy, 
especially services, whose earlier development was limited by the 
cost of labor. The end result may well be an increase of employment 
and lower wages, so that work and labor income sharing are 
attained. But this policy also leads to an increase of inequality and 
working poverty (see Francesco Saraceno in this issue). It has a social 
cost, with redistribution from the unskilled to the skilled, which in 
addition benefit from cheaper services provided by the unskilled 
workers forced to accept jobs at the limit of dignity.  It is the task of 
the political debate to settle the question of whether the neo-liberal 
management of unemployment should be accepted or not.
The other option for job sharing is collective reduction of 
working time. It can be permanent as was the case in France during 
the transition to 35 hours working week. In this case there needs to 
be an assessment of the long term growth prospects of sectors that 
need to be supported, or on the contrary dismissed. In the case of 
work sharing by the market, we have seen that some service sectors 
were favored by increased flexibility. One can legitimately chal-
lenge the interest of creating such low-quality jobs, and prefer a 
collective and orderly reduction of working time. As an alternative, 
the collective reduction of working time can also be counter-
cyclical and temporary. This is the solution put forward in 
Germany, which has also been applied, to a lower extent, in France 
and in other countries. Partial unemployment is the preferred 
means of this form of “social” sharing.  Its limit is obviously the 
fact that it only applies to existing workers.
If we admit that there are multiple solutions to work-sharing, 
and that collective organization may be equally effective as sharing 
by the market, then it possible to discuss on the two methods and 
their combinations.
We must choose whether to focus on the market or on collective 
organization. Focus “market-sharing” means reducing the coverage 
of unemployment insurance, limit workers’ rights, and avoid 
minimum wages. If “social” sharing is favored, it must instead 
have an explicit national wage policy with widely applied 
minimum wage and generous unemployment insurance. There 
also need to be an extensive system of partial unemployment to 
manage work sharing during the cycle; this latter feature could be 
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organized across the EU to maximize the stabilizing effect of the 
system in case of asymmetric shocks. In the long term it is the 
social and political debate that should choose the sectors to 
develop and elaborate guidelines on working time references. 
Market and social work sharing are not totally exclusive. In practice, 
labor market institutions combine both methods. In France the 
weakened application of labor laws has allowed the massive devel-
opment of part-time and short or very short duration jobs. But the 
effect of this liberalization has been limited by the existence of a 
minimum wage and relatively generous unemployment insur-
ance. In Germany, work sharing was overwhelmingly initiated by 
the reduction of unemployment insurance in the context of no 
general minimum wage. But in this crisis it is “social” work sharing 
arrangements that have prevented a sharp rise in unemploy-
ment. The prospect of establishing a general minimum wage in 
Germany should bring it closer to the social sharing model. It 
would be useful to have a collective discussion about the desirable 
combination of liberal and social sharing allowing to put in place 
incentives to work when at full employment, to set the minimum 
acceptable wage in each European country, and to clarify the 
boundaries between decent work and undignified minijobs.
The problem is that without explicit discussion about these 
choices, countries that favor the neo-liberal work sharing will 
always have an advantage over their EU partners. In a world of 
pure competition, the lowest bidder in the social sphere will always 
win. With massive unemployment, unhindered markets will lead 
to sharp wage decreases that will either directly, or directly 
through cost decreases in non-tradable service sectors, allow to 
increase competitiveness with respect to countries that choose to 
keep labor protection. The broad lines of social choice work-
sharing and income should be set collectively if we want to lift 
Europe out of a vicious circle of social competition that ultimately 
can only lead to dissolving the Union.
3. Social Europe in practice
Beyond the grand themes of economic and labor market poli-
cies adapted to the heterogeneous European countries’ situations, 
we must face many practical questions in order to make compat-
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ible the free movement of persons, competition in markets for 
goods and services and free choice by each country about its social 
protection and labor market institutions.
Two approaches are possible depending on whether one wishes 
to maintain the full freedom of Member States in the definition 
and management of social protection or one opts for reducing 
such a freedom with the scope of progressing towards common 
institutions including social protection. The prospect of social 
harmonization, similar to what was done for the goods market, 
must be studied. But it goes without saying that this is a very long-
term perspective and only limited progress is to be expected in the 
coming decade.4
The first option involves the precise definition of “social 
boundaries” to ensure States that their laws cannot be circum-
vented by opportunistic choices about the location of businesses 
and jobs. The domain of public social protection must be clearly 
defined, so that the European Court of Justice does not have to 
deliberate about the boundaries between public and private insur-
ance, creating a legal uncertainty that hampers the freedom choice 
of States. The principle of free movement of persons could be 
strengthened by clarifying the mechanisms of detaching workers
and strengthening the rights of citizens of the Union who succes-
sively work in different countries. For detached workers, in 
addition to issues of controlling the application of the rules, which 
are being resolved, the problem is the link with the country of 
origin’s social protection system. This rule allows direct competi-
tion with social workers in the country where the worker is 
detached, if the latter is a country that imposes higher social 
contributions.5 There are two options to avoid this competition: 
the first is to require the detached workers to pay social contribu-
tions in the destination country, with benefits computed 
proportionally to the time spent paying contributions to each 
4. Europe realized the customs union and the complete unification of the goods market. The 
Eurozone has unified its currency... and yet the EU has not been able to establish a common tax 
base for corporate taxes. It also failed to unify indirect taxation. As a consequence, tax 
competition crowds out economic activity. It is clear that a social unification of Europe is much 
more complex and, if we want to undertake it, is a much longer term endeavor.
5. When a country finance social spending by general taxation, the social contribution rate is 
lower. It follows that even with identical coverage detaching a worker in a country with higher 
social contributions will be cheaper than directly hiring a worker in situ.
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system Public or private systems of social insurances would have 
legally no right to impose a qualification period (particularly with 
regard to retirement). This solution would also clarify the situation 
of those working in different countries without being detached; for 
these workers it should actually be considered independently of 
the treatment of detached workers. A second option would be for 
the detached workers to maintain affiliation to the country of 
origin’s social security system that would then receive the contri-
butions from the destination country’s system the paid 
contributions. If these were larger than normal, additional rights 
could be triggered. If these are lower, then the firm should cover 
the difference for its detached worker. Whatever the chosen solu-
tion, improving the transferability of contributions and rights 
would also be favorable to the mobility of workers
In Europe many systems coexist that for financing rely on taxes 
and contributions in a different way, which implement public 
social protection system, or mixed public and private systems with 
different coverage, which chose different levels of protection for 
the poor or for families. This explains the difficulty of harmo-
nizing, and the postponement, since the beginning of the EU, of a 
social union. Some partial solutions have nevertheless been 
proposed, for unemployment benefits, whose countercyclical 
features are paramount.6
A common unemployment insurance scheme would subtract it 
from the domain of fiscal rules and allow using it more effectively 
as an automatic stabilizer after both a symmetric and or asym-
metric shock. It is nevertheless impossible to endow the 
Commission with the management of the scheme, or even with 
the condition for the aid. Unemployment insurance systems are 
based on very different combinations of general means-tested 
benefits and direct benefits of the unemployment insurance 
scheme. Therefore, seemingly more generous countries in terms of 
direct unemployment benefits can in the end be as generous 
towards the unemployed as countries that use a mix of different 
benefits (Coquet, 2013) . A Global regulation of unemployment 
6. The proposal of a euro-wide unemployment insurance is old. It is found already in 1975 in 
the “Marjolin” Report (Commission of the European Communities (1975)). For a recent 
proposal, see for example: Henrik Enderlin, Luca Guttenberg Jann and Spiess (2013)
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insurance is therefore illusory and very risky for the unemployed of 
countries that have opted for social regulation of the labor 
market. The only possibility is implementing a system of uncondi-
tional transfers in case of negative economic shocks. Being 
proportional to the magnitude of the shock, such a transfer system 
would help strengthening the automatic stabilization of the 
economy, which would benefit the whole Union. Such a mecha-
nism would also strengthen solidarity among Member States of the 
Union. A precondition for it, on the other hand, would be that an 
agreement is reached on the broad guidelines for economic and 
social policies of the European Union. Europe has probably 
reached the point at which the method of small steps and gradual 
harmonization is no longer effective. Even small steps now involve 
an agreement on principles that is not limited to form. Referring to 
social Europe without specifying the content is no longer enough.
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